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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE SOUTHLAND CORPORATION, ) 
a Texas corporation, ) 
Plainti ff-Appellant ) 
and Cross-Respondent, ) APPELLANT'S REPLY 
) BRIEF AND CROSS-
v. ' ) RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
GAIL C. POTTER AND LORI ) 
POTTER, his wife, ) Case No. 860413 
Defendants-Respondents ) 
and Cross-Appellants. ) 
Plaintiff-appellant and cross respondent, The Southland 
Corporation ("plaintiff"), hereby replies to the respondents' 
brief of defendants-respondents, Gail C. Potter and Lori 
Potter, his wife ("defendants"). 
Although no cross-appellants' brief as such was filed, 
the issue was treated in their respondents' brief and will 
be responded to herein. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
There appears to be little dispute between the parties 
as to the issues presented on the appeal of this matter, 
except for the manner in which the issue on the cross-appeal 
was framed by defendants. It implies that there was a 
continuing trespass by plaintiff on defendants' property, 
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which plaintiff emphatically denies. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although most of the facts are also not seriously in 
dispute, plaintiff strongly disagrees with several of the 
statements made by defendants in their respondents1 brief. 
First, defendants allege that plaintiff has "160 feet 
of access on a Salt Lake County road." This is just not 
true. The evidence established that as a condition to 
obtaining its building permit, plaintiff was required to 
install high-back curbing, landscaping and sidewalk along 
all but 30 feet of said distance along 6200 South Street 
(Ex. 8). And even that limited drive entrance is subject to 
being shut off by West Jordan City (R. 191; Ex. 3). As will 
be noted below, these facts bear heavily upon several of the 
issues presented for review, including the intent of the 
original parties. 
Second, defendants contend that the contracts between 
plaintiff and its grantor do not make any mention "of any 
easement, purchase, grant, or rights of ingress or egress or 
other rights of access over any property other than that 
specifically described in the agreements." Again, this is 
just not true. The original contract (Ex. 1) clearly 
indicated that there would be "open access" between the 
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7-Eleven store property and the rest of the shopping center. 
The amended contract (Ex. 2) which was entered into so that 
the entire shopping center area could be rezoned, indicated 
that the property in question would be "open parking." In 
addition, there was a specific written agreement (Ex. 3) 
that the parties1 predecessor in title would allow two 
accesses off Dixie Drive. 
Next, defendants cite Mr. Bowles1 testimony that it was 
never Big Six's intent to grant 7-Eleven access across the 
parcel in question. The answer related only to Mr. Bowles1 
intent, not Big Six's. Besides, that intent is immaterial 
and it conflicts with other evidence, including the 
testimony of Mr. Bowles himself. Moreover, Mr. Bowles 
testified only that there had been some talk about installa-
tion of gasoline pumps (R. 206). There was no testimony 
that Big Six ever actually intended to so use the property. 
All of the testimony is in fact to the contrary. It was to 
remain open for common use. 
In their brief, defendants make various objections to 
the letter agreement (Ex. 3), but they have little materi-
ality. The statement that Mr. Buchanan, the former City 
Planner, never saw the document in the city's file is in 
error. He stated (R. 194) "I also have seen this letter in 
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a file which the engineers for the city at the time had—so, 
I have seen it twice." 
There is no evidence to support the assertion that 
plaintiff continually trespassed on defendants1 property. 
Plaintiff has acknowledged that its customers and suppliers 
drove across part of the property, all in accordance with 
the terms of its agreement with both West Jordan City and 
Big Six. However, defendants1 statement that "Southland was 
utilizing the property continually for parking, selling cars 
and in fact painted lines on the ground" is completely 
unsupported by the evidence. 7-Eleven stores are not in the 
business of selling cars and plaintiff believes that 
judicial notice of this fact can be taken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The evidence established that there was an agreement 
between plaintiff and the parties' common predecessor in 
title that it would have access over the property in 
question, which agreement ran with the land; and the fact 
that defendants own the property in fee simple is not 
controlling. 
Throughout these proceedings, defendants' principal 
defense has been reliance upon the fact that there was no 
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actual "conveyance" within the meaning of Section 57-1-6, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to plaintiff of any interest in 
the property. That is not, however, the only way that 
interest in real property, or at least the right to use 
someone elsefs real property, can be obtained. That, 
plaintiff submits, is clearly pointed out in its appellant's 
brief and it would serve no useful purpose to repeat the 
arguments made therein. Several contentions made by defen-
dants in response to that point do, however, deserve reply. 
For one, the statute of frauds (Section 25-5-3, U.C.A., 
1953) is simply not applicable. Neither are the two cases 
cited under Point I of their respondents' brief. Gold Oil 
Land Development Corp. v. Davis, 611 P.2d 711 (Utah 1980), 
merely reaffirmed the long-standing doctrine that considera-
tion and delivery are both necessary for the validity of a 
deed. Another case cited by them, Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 
Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967), is not, so far as 
plaintiff can perceive, relative in any way to the issues 
involved in this action. The other case, Davison v. 
Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973), is relevant 
to some extent; but to such extent, it supports plaintiff. 
Here the property which was to remain open for common use by 
plaintiff and other occupants of the shopping center, is 
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clearly established on the ground. It was blacktopped by 
plaintiff at the very beginning and with the concurrence of 
the common predecessor in title. It was also noted on the 
contracts of sale (Exs.l and 2). Defendants in fact have 
had no trouble throughout these proceedings or in their 
brief identifying the parcel in question, even though it was 
part of a much larger parcel conveyed to them in one deed 
and by one description. 
Plaintiff has acknowledged that there was no actual 
written "conveyance" to it of any interest in such property. 
It does contend, however, and it believes this contention is 
supported by the authorities cited in its appellant's brief, 
that there was an agreement running with the land that 
access to the 7-Eleven store over such property would not be 
entirely shut off. Defendants were aware of the use being 
made of the property at the time they purchased it (as 
admitted on page 7 of their brief) and all of the elements 
necessary to constitute an agreement running with the land 
were present. Thus, they are bound by it and cannot now 
totally deprive plaintiff of all access over such property. 
Defendants have also consistently argued that there was 
no consideration paid for such use. It takes only a cursory 
examination of the events leading up to the purchase of 
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plaintiff's property and the construction of its store to 
dispel such notion. It is not, as defendants contend, 
"attempting to obtain, for free, that which they never 
purchased." 
From the evidence as a whole, a picture emerges of 
plaintiff working with Big Six (the common predecessor in 
title) to establish a small shopping center. Plaintiff 
purchased the lot in the shopping center and Big Six was 
happy to sell it because, as Mr. Bowles testified, they 
needed money. Plaintiff then worked closely with Big Six to 
have the property rezoned so that the shopping center could 
be established. Plaintiff reoriented its building to 
accommodate Big Six, which is something that would not have 
been accomplished if it felt that the promise to provide 
access would be reneged upon and that it would later be 
fronting upon someone else's property rather than the 
street. Few businesses, let alone a convenience store, 
could survive under such circumstances. Plaintiff's 
accommodation even required it to purchase more property 
from Big Six than would originally have been needed. Hence, 
defendants' claim that plaintiff is trying to get something 
for free is clearly erroneous. 
Defendants have argued that the West Jordan City 
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Planning Commission has only advisory powers and has even 
attached portions of the Planning Act as an addendum to 
their brief. As noted in appellant's brief, plaintiff's are 
no where contending that the Planning Commission had 
authority to impose an easement upon defendants' property. 
However, anyone who attempts to obtain a building permit for 
commercial property knows that the action of a Planning 
Commission can make or break a project. In the present 
case, the actions of the West Jordan City Planning Commis-
sion has been relied upon by plaintiff to show the circum-
stances under which the agreement reached with Big Six came 
about. That action bears heavily upon the intention of the 
parties in arriving at the agreements which turned the 
7-Eleven store away from facing 6200 South and motivated Big 
Six into signing the agreement that access would be provided 
off Dixie Drive to the store. 
POINT II 
The evidence was sufficient to establish that plaintiff 
gained an implied easement over the property in question. 
In their respondents' brief, defendants equate "implied 
easement" with "ways of necessity." Although these terms 
are sometimes confused, as shown by the cases and partic-
ularly by the Restatement of Property cited in appellant's 
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b r i e f , ai n i iiipl ied easemei it ma} ari se e^ ei :i ii i 1 t l le a bsence c f 
ai1 absolute necessity. Here, plaintiff believes, the 
easement is plaint implied from the circumstances surround-
ing the purchase o the property by plaint; :; rr .; -:.• 
parties 1 common predecessor in title. 
I' I.,11 i"11- i i: f d o e s iici) t c o i l t ei I< :i f 1 iat e:i ther Savage v. 
Nielsen, 114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117 (1948) , nor Adamson v. 
Brockbank„ 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947) are factually : 
j d e n t i c a .1 v i •  i: e c i t e d f c • i t h e p i o p o s i t i o n t h a t U t a h 
does recognize the difference between a way of absolute 
necessity and an easement by implication which is based on 
reasonable necessity. In both cases this court recognized 
that absolute necessity was not require*! *o establish an 
*-.-*'-»--> "•-* - , PI a inti ff si ibi ' - i 
tests set fort:. :; . >tn cases have beei I t • •.< present 
case and an easement by implication should .«: found. 
11 i a i i ] 21 e i 1 1 , c:i e f e n d a i I t s l ci I s c n s s :i - h e Savage; c a s e 
is only pertinent where the claimant is tl le conveyor not the 
conveyee, but an easement by implication may be found in 
f a v o r o f e 1 1:1 I e i: F u r 11: i e i:, d e f e n ci a i I t s I i: e p e a 1: e d a s s e i: 11 :> n 
that plaintiff has 1 60 feet of public access is clearly 
unreasonable. As noted above, such access is attainable 
only through legally allowed curbcuts or drive entrances. 
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In this case, on 6200 South there is only one 30-foot 
entrance for both ingress and egress to the store and 
gasoline islands and most of the 160 feet is to the side or 
to the rear of the store itself, which would also make 
access unreasonable. 
The reason for the citation by defendants of the 
factors delineated in Restatement of Property, § 476, is 
unclear. That section merely notes that those are some of 
the factors to be considered in determining whether an 
easement by implication has been established. That section 
continues: 
The list of factors here stated is not 
exhaustive. The circumstances through which the 
implication of an easement may arise are varied. 
The factors relevant to the determination of the 
implication are numerous. Those here considered 
are those more commonly occurring. 
The Rationale for the factors—particularly appropriate 
here—is quoted at page 21 of appellant's brief. It is 
appropriate because plaintiff believes that if the parties 
had given further thought to the subject, a document 
creating an express easement would have been created. 
However, neither party realized that the situation over a 
period of years would change so drastically. Thus, one 
additional sentence from that Rationale deserves quotation: 
In the latter aspect, the implication 
approaches in fact, if not in theory, crediting 
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the parties with an intention which they did not 
have but which they probably would have had had 
they actually foreseen what they might have seen 
from information available at the time of the 
conveyance. 
Finally, defendants1 statement (p. II) 'that they have 
never asserted [the easement] until now" is perplexing. 
P ] a i n t i f f,, a t t : 1 1 € t i m e : f c o n s 1; l ': • i i d i n g, 
filled and blacktopped the area : i .ue t.i :^ ^stalled curb 
and gutter and landscaping v.* there have been :> complaints 
regarding its use i int:j Il : :•--».- .1 - :;•; t . I it 
that time, the claim was immediately asserted. 
POINT III 
The Findings of Fact are inadequate, unsupported by the 
evidence and insufficient to support the trial court's 
judgment and the fact that plaintiff did not file an 
objection before the trial court does not prevent it from 
raising the issue here. 
P1 a i n t i f f h a s p o 11 11 e d c 1; 1 1: i 1 1 i t s a p p e 2 ] a n I:" s b r i e f (1 ) 
that the findings are totally inadequate and on many 
material issues there • - ~ finding st :!" --nd (2) thai 
neither the Findings o . - - - .or tl : •. ioi is of I ia%i ai e 
sufficient to support H I P trial court 5 judgment. Despite 
defendants '" prool ai ined con fus i on , the deficiencies are set 
forth in appellant's brief. 
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The fact that no objection was made before the trial 
court does not help defendants. Rule 52, U.R.C.P., clearly 
allows a challenge to be made in this Court whether or not 
the party raising the question had made an objection to such 
findings in the District court. 
Defendants also appear to be saying that since the 
findings are as long as the principal allegation in the 
complaint, they are sufficient. However, this just do€*s not 
follow. Under Rule 8, U.R.C.P., the complaint shall only 
"contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . . " 
However, such a short statement may involve a number of 
material factual issues. Rule 52 and the pertinent cases 
require that on a case tried to the court without a jury 
Findings of Fact must be made on all such material issues. 
RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPEAL 
Defendants filed a cross-appeal in this matter 
challenging the action of the trial court in dismissing 
their claim for damages on the basis that damages were not 
support by the evidence. They have not, however, filed 
either a cost bond in connection with such cross-appeal or a 
cross-appellants1 brief. However, the issue was raised in 
their respondents1 brief and without waiving the position 
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t h a t t h e c r o s s - a p p e a 31 s 1 i o t:i ] ci i i < : I b e h e a r ci, ]: »] a I n t I f f h e r e b y 
responds to those contentions made therein. 
The trial cour*~ * *- ruling that defendants have not 
*• ** i r>- - . . ••• supported oi i a number of 
grounds rst, tho cni; evidence offered concerning 
supposed damages was a- • ^ M alleged rental value of the 
property "i ™ anes+-?on ;_ -,><:• n-ony was elicited from,, 
defendant Fitter aiui (apart from being questionable on its 
i, • \-~ \ . • . i < VMS inM" ir: I*M i seci, by 
the pleadings. 
Ii i their counterclaim, defendants 1 only averment or 
demand, (re] atii ig tc < r — 
an accounting and judgment against the 
plaintiff in a sum equal to $1 for every automo-
bile using, crossing or occupying space upon the 
defendants 1 property. 
*-: ' :'' .• • • x ' M T i r nil'i i I I 
the Lria. hereof. M .-a. amendment i tne counter-
claim, nc motion t- .tmer.d the counterclaim M ; confirm with 
t h e e v I, d e n,„ c e a n ci o b j e c t:„ „:i <::> i :i„ w a s 11 :i„ f a c" -^ - * 11 :i„ e t:„ e s t:„ i -
mony. Defendants should not be allowed t ,er up a demand 
which was not only speculative, unprovable and without 
f o ii ii d a " !::,„ 1 I e i i a, t t:„ 1 i e 11: ,i„ a ] s w „i„ 1: c 1 i, I: o a ci i f f e r e i :i„ !::„ 
measure o: damages. 
Second, the testimony of defendant Potter as to the 
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rental value was so ambiguous, implausible and in conflict 
with the facts, that it need not have been accepted by the 
trial court even though no opposing testimony as to rental 
value was introduced. When he was asked as to whether he 
had "the value" (sic) as to the rental value and following 
objection, he replied that "the high value of that property 
would be $4,000 a month. The low figure would be around 20 
to $2,500." 
Even assuming that the figure "20" means $2,000, there 
is still a 100 percent variance in the range. This is too 
speculative and insufficient to enable the trier of fact to 
place a rental value upon the property. Moreover, even the 
rate of $2,000 per month would place a value of the corner 
parcel at approximately $240,000 (assuming a ten percent 
return). This is more than half of the total purchase price 
for the full 5.92 acres (R. 241) and ten times the cost of 
the 7-Eleven store property (which is twice as large) ten 
years earlier (Exs. 1 and 2). Thus, even though there was 
no contradictory testimony, the court was not obligated to 
accept defendant Potters1 testimony. 
Apart from the above, defendant Potters' testimony 
regarding the supposed rental value of the property was 
nothing more than that. No where is there any testimony as 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to h o w t h i s r e l a t e s • «» hi"' jl I'J'|H(J damn^e:- -»fendant 
Potters1 own testimony woula indicate that the property was 
used by others than plaintiff. Thus, even assuming that 
defendant Potters1 testimony regarding 1: :he renta] ^ ? .: ae 
could be accepted, there is absolutely no evidence as ^ the 
amount of lamages suste * !1' ' 'v c,indair s as a rebuic o±. its 
partial use by plaintiff ".-, ustomers and suppliers. 
Third, defendants ' - ^ -. i' ^ th" rental va . ;e * - r> 
proper ty < *-•' - the i '*r>«- * . 
plaintiff '-• , tli only testimony by defendant- Pottci 
relates to used cars parked on thn corner for sale. Thus, 
d e f e n d a n t P o t t e r t e s t i f i e d I II'• I : 
Okay, \-:\. have seen what kind, , what kind 
Of 1. F TOirw OI':.5 
combination of used car lot sales. 
? 
Well, there have consistently been parked 
the times I have seen it, numerous cars parked on 
the strip with for sale signs on them. As of 
yesterday when I came by there, there were five or 
six parked on there with for sale signs on it, so 
they have been using it. 
T h e s i in p 1 e f a c t o f 11 i e in a f t e r i s t: 1 I a t: p 1 a i n t i f f d o e s 
not engage in used (or new) car sales and the use defendant 
Potter
 0 j D S e r v e c | w a s ^ unknown third parties. This use 
cannot be charged to plaintiff. 
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Fourth, there is no evidence that defendants have been 
in any way damaged by whatever use of the property occurred. 
The property in question was filled, blacktopped and 
landscaped by plaintiff in 1979, all at the insistence of 
West Jordan City and with the express approval of Big Six. 
Any use since that time by plaintiff's customers and 
suppliers, has at least been permissive. It was acquired in 
June 1984 by defendants and no objection was made to such 
use for eighteen months. Mr. Potter testified that the 
first time he put 7-Eleven on notice that he felt they were 
trespassers was at the time of the construction of the fence 
in January 1986 (R. 219). Thus, even if it should be 
established that plaintiff has no rights over the property 
by virtue of the agreements with Big Six or as the result of 
an implied easement, its use was at least with the permis-
sion of the owners until January 8, 19 86. Even then, 
following the hearing on January 20, 1986, it was agreed 
that the use could continue for a period of two more months. 
The fence was again reinstalled in August 1986 and has not 
been used by anyone since that time. Hence, even if 
defendants were entitled to any damages for the rental value 
of the property, it would only be for a few months in 19 86 
after any permissive use was withdrawn. 
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Moi: e o v e r , i t • - - • • • • • ' • * e 
Motion for Temporary injunction "- ri.it. defendants 
had no immediate use for the property and that the sixty-day 
delay would have no harmful effect, Tl u is, they cai 11 lot i lot 
reasonably argue that whatever use was made of the property 
I: •; , p] ai nti ff '" s ci istomers and si ipp] i ers that they have in any 
way been damaged. 
Defendants conclude their brief with i statement < at 
. o . " \ ' ' " 11: y i i i ij t ::) g i: a b p r o p e i: t y w. • e y n e 
owned f for nothing, from an innocent third party. Th<-
attempt itself is reprehensible." 
That statement is complete nonsense. If anything is 
reprehensible, :J is defendants 1 refusal to allow use c f any 
o f t h e p r o p e r * *- • v e i i t h o u g h t h e y we i: e aw a r e wl 1 e n they 
purchased the entire tract that: it: was essential to the 
operation r r the 7-Eleven store which had nothing but a 
i: 1 a r r o w s . - e s s w i t: h o i 11 I I: , a n d e v e i i t h c 1 i g h t h e y w e i: e 
then put on notice of the earlier agreements between 
plaintiff and their seller. *~eir efforts have reducec to 
marginal | *m f 11 a1 • • " •' • >\y\>n- wu.n u ums put-v I O U S iy hi*. .,/ 
successful and wlu«;:; had cooperated with the parties 
predecessor in an effort to make both that store and the 
entire shopping center profitable. Moreover, plaintiff Is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not in any way seeking to prevent defendants from using the 
property but only in obtaining what they thought they were 
receiving from cooperative efforts with such predecessor— 
that is the right to have reasonable ingress and egress over 
such property in order to continue to function as a 
convenience store. 
CONCLUSION 
As to the reply portion of this brief, the relief 
sought by plaintiff is set forth in its Appellant's Brief. 
As to the cross-appeal of defendants, they have presented 
nothing which would establish that they are in any way 
entitled to damages even if it should be determined that 
plaintiff has no rights over the property. The evidence 
clearly established that even if such is the case, the use 
during the period involved is at least permissive and the 
trial court's judgment as to the counterclaim should be 
upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of January, 19 87. 
Ralph L. Jerman 
B. L. Dart 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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I certify that on the i<*\* :»f January, 1987, four 
true and correct copies of Appellant's Reply Brief and 
Cross-Respondent's Brief were served upon defendants by 
mailing copies thereof to Robert M Felton, attorney for 
defendants, 5 Triad Center, Suite 585, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84180, postage prepaid. 
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